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THE END OF THE LEEGIN SAGA AND THE BEGINNING OF 
DEVELOPMENT FOR THE RULE OF REASON IN RPM CASES
Yoshiteru UEMURA＊
    Resale Price Maintenance (“RPM”) is a type of vertical agreement made among economic 
entities on the dif ferent levels of distribution for the sale of products or services, by setting the 
minimum price below which the products or services cannot be sold. Generally speaking, 
vertical restraints of trade have been treated less severely than horizontal restraints of trade, 
such as price fixing among competitors, which always, or almost always, tend to restrict 
competition and reduce output without any rewarding virtues. However, the only exception to 
the lenient rule for the vertical restraints was RPM. RPM had been treated illegal per se, just 
like horizontal restrains since Dr. Miles in 1911, until the Leegin Court overruled the 
longstanding precedent in 2007. During that period, many arguments against the per se illegal 
treatment for RPM had emerged from mostly antitrust economists who regarded promotion of 
the interbrand competition of dif ferent brands as more important compared to intrabrand 
competition within the same brand.
    In the four years after Leegin, several RPM-related cases were brought before the federal 
courts where deep discussions ensued contemplating the factors to consider when assessing RPM 
under the rule of reason. While the Leegin decision gained full support from the federal antitrust 
enforcers, Congress simultaneously embarked on a mission to legislatively negate the decision. 
Today, in the face of strong opposition both in and out of Congress, and several failed legislative 
attempts, the Leegin decision still stands firmly.
    At the end of the lengthy Leegin litigation, this paper aims to explore the development after 
Leegin in executive, judicial, and legislative branches of federal government, focusing on how 
the Leegin decision and its related cases have affected the treatment of RPM at the federal level.
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INTRODUCTION
    Since the groundbreaking decision of the Supreme Court in Leegin,１） Resale Price Maintenance 
( “RPM”) has been a controversial issue not only in courts but also in Congress. It is true that Leegin is 
marked an epoch in U.S. antitrust law when it overruled the longstanding per se rule against RPM 
established by Dr. Miles２） and instead declared the application of the rule of reason. However, although 
Leegin mentioned some factors which could lead RPM to illegality under the rule of reason, it is also true 
that Leegin did not answer ‘how’ and ‘on what standard’ the lower courts should decide in each RPM 
case. Explicitly, the Leegin Court stated that “[i]f the rule of reason were to apply to vertical price 
restraints, courts would have to be diligent in eliminating their anticompetitive uses from the market.”３） 
The court continued further “[a]s courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by 
applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to 
ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more 
guidance to businesses.”４） To put it simply, the Leegin Court expected lower courts to devise workable 
standards for RPM through discussion in the courtroom.
    Following the remand decisions by the lower courts in 2009 and 2010, the lengthy antitrust litigation 
which had lasted since 2003 came to an end on February 22, 2011.５） In this paper, following the quick 
review of the Leegin decision (Chapter I), post-Leegin movement in executive, judicial and legislative 
branches of federal government was summarized (Chapter II), in addition to the analysis of the remand 
decisions of Leegin (Chapter III).
Ⅰ．LEEGIN
A.  Factual Background 6)
    Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (“Leegin”) designed, manufactured, and distributed leather 
goods and accessories (handbags, belts, jewelry, etc.) under the brand name “Brighton”. The Brighton 
brand is sold across the United States in over 5,000 retail establishments, for the most part independent, 
small boutiques and specialty stores. While Leegin distributed Brighton products at the wholesale level to 
independent retailers, it also owned and controlled about 70 Brighton retail stores. Leegin believed that at 
least for its products, small retailers tended to treat customers better, provide customers with more 
services, and make their shopping experience more satisfactory than the larger, often impersonal, 
retailers.
    PSKS, Inc. (“PSKS”), operated Kay’ s Kloset, a retail fashion and accessories store in Lewisville, Texas, 
that sold Brighton products and goods from many other manufacturers to consumers in the greater Dallas 
area. Once Kay’ s Kloset started selling Brighton products, they became the destination retailer in the area 
to buy the brand products. Brighton was the store’ s most important brand and accounted for 40 to 50 
percent of its profits at one time.
    In 1997, Leegin instituted a new pricing policy, which enabled Leegin to refuse to sell to retailers that 
discounted Brighton products below suggested prices, expressing concern that discounting harmed 
Brighton’ s brand image and reputation. Leegin adopted the pricing policy to give its retailers sufficient 
margins to provide customers with better treatment, more services, and more a satisfactory shopping 
experience.
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    Although Kay’ s Kloset was one of the retailers who pledged to sell Brighton products at Leegin’ s 
suggested prices, it was discovered they had been significantly marking down Brighton’ s entire line. 
Therefore, this meant PSKS violated Leegin’ s pricing policy by offering Brighton products at discounted 
prices through Kay’ s Kloset store. When PSKS refused to cease discounting, Leegin stopped selling to the 
store. The loss of the Brighton brand had a considerable negative impact on the store’ s revenue from sales, 
which, in the end, led PSKS out of business.
    PSKS sued Leegin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas alleging that 
Leegin had entered into vertical RPM agreements with retailers, and that Leegin had violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. Leegin planned to introduce expert testimony describing the procompetitive effects of 
its pricing policy. The district court, however, excluded the testimony, relying on the per se rule established 
by Dr. Miles. The jury awarded $3,975,000.80 to PSKS as treble damages arising out of violation of the 
Sherman Act.
    Leegin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“Fifth Circuit”). On appeal 
Leegin contended that the rule of reason should have applied to its vertical price fixing agreements with 
retailers. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’ s ruling and rejected this argument, holding that the 
Supreme Court had consistently applied the per se rule to vertical minimum RPM agreements. The U.S. 
Supreme Court (the “Court”) granted certiorari to ascertain whether RPM agreements should continue 
to be treated as illegal per se.
B.  Supreme Court Opinion７）
    Before deciding whether RPM agreement should continue to be treated as illegal per se, the Court 
examined the standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Although the Court acknowledged the doctrine of stare decisis, it did not blindly follow the 
per se rule but instead referred to a need to change the rule to meet the evolving and dynamic economic 
climate. Therefore, the Court identified the rule of reason as the accepted and prevailing standard for 
outlawing only unreasonable restraints with anticompetitive ef fect. On the other hand, the Court 
acknowledged that some types of restraints, including horizontal agreements among competitors to fix 
prices or to divide market, have manifestly anticompetitive effects and lack any redeeming virtue. The 
Supreme Court opined that types of restraints are illegal per se and no further analysis is needed to 
determine the illegality of the restraints. The Supreme Court, however, confined the application of the per 
se rule to the restraints that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output. The Court also stated that the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable 
experience with the type of restraint at issue８）,  and only if court can predict with confidence that it would 
be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.９） The Court admitted its reluctance to 
adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the 
economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious, and concluded that a departure from the 
rule-of -reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than upon formalistic 
line drawing.10）
    As for Dr. Miles, which had been interpreted by the Supreme Court as establishing the per se rule 
against a vertical agreement between manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum resale prices, the 
Court found that the reason upon which Dr. Miles relied did not justify the per se rule11）. Dr. Miles found 
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the manufacturer’ s control of resale prices to be unlawful relying on the common-law rule that a general 
restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid, and in turn, treated vertical agreements a manufacturer 
makes with its distributors as analogous to a horizontal combination among competing distributors without 
considering differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements. After deciding that 
Dr. Miles justification of the per se rule toward RPM was unreasonable, the Court examined the economic 
effects of RPM and sought to determine whether the per se rule was nonetheless appropriate.
    The Court referred to economics literature being replete with discussions on procompetitive justification 
for a manufacture’ s use of RPM, and that recent studies, including empirical evidence, also cast doubt on 
the conclusion that the practice meets the criteria for a per se rule.12） The Court highlighted the fact that 
even the skeptics of RPM acknowledge it can have procompetitive effects.
    The Court held that the justification for RPM is similar to those for other vertical restraints, which is the 
stimulation of interbrand competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the same type of 
product.13） It is true that RPM can reduce intrabrand competition among retailers selling the same brand, 
but the justification for RPM is important because the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect 
interbrand competition. Absent RPM, the retail services such as fine showroom, products demonstrations, 
and knowledgeable employees, which contribute to enhance interbrand competition might be 
underprovided because discounting retailers could ‘free ride’ on retailers who furnish the services and 
then capture some of the increased demand those services generate.14） That prospect would force those 
retailers to cut back their services to a level lower than consumers would otherwise prefer.
    In addition, the Court acknowledged that RPM could increase interbrand competition by facilitating 
market entry for new firms and brands and by encouraging retailer services that would not be provided 
even absent ‘free riding’.15） The Court also pointed out the probability that the market would be 
penetrated and more efficient retailers would provide more valuable services for consumers by the use of 
RPM.16）
    While admitting interbrand competition as procompetitive justification for RPM, the Court highlighted 
some cases in which RPM may have anticompetitive effects, and warned that the potential anticompetitive 
consequences of RPM should not be ignored or underestimated.17） According to the Court, RPM could 
facilitate a manufacturer cartel by identifying price-cutting manufacturers in an unlawful cartel. RPM could 
also be used to organize retailer cartels by compelling a manufacturer to aid the unlawful arrangement at 
the retailer level. Furthermore, RPM could be abused by a powerful manufacturer or retailer. A dominant 
retailer might request a manufacturer to accept the retailer’ s demand for RPM in order to forestall 
innovation in distribution when the manufacturer needs access to the retailer’ s distribution network. A 
manufacturer with market power, on the other hand, has a possibility to use RPM to give retailers an 
incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new entrants.
    In light of the potential anticompetitive effects associated with RPM, the Court found that no one could 
state with any degree of confidence that RPM always or almost always tends to restrict competition and 
decrease output because RPM can be either procompetitive or anticompetitive, depending upon the 
circumstances in which they are formed.18） The Court also found that the limited empirical evidence 
available did not suggest that efficient uses of RPM are infrequent or hypothetical.19）
    The Court then argued about the contention PSKS expressed for its position. At first, PSKS insisted that 
RPM should be illegal per se because the per se rules tended to provide guidance to the business 
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community and minimize the burden on litigants and judicial system, thereby contributing to a decreased 
administrative cost. The Court, however, decided that the per se rule should not be adopted for 
administrative convenience alone, and recognized it was only part of the equation.20） A per se rule can be 
counterproductive, the Court stated, increasing the total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting 
procompetitive conduct which the antitrust laws should encourage. The Court also pointed out the 
possible increase of litigation costs the per se rule could cause by the frequency of frivolous lawsuits 
against legitimate practices. Secondly, PSKS argued that the per se rule for RPM was justified by the 
possibility of higher prices for the products sold. In response to this argument, the Court stated that the 
possibility of higher prices without a further showing of anticompetitive conduct was not enough to decide 
whether the welfare effects of RPM were procompetitive or anticompetitive, confirming again that the 
antitrust laws were designed primarily to protect interbrand competition, from which lower prices could 
later result. The Court, moreover, singled out the flaw of the argument for a per se rule, stating that it 
overlooked the interests of manufacturers and consumers are generally aligned with respect to retailer 
profit margins.21） This is because the difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and 
the price retailers charge consumers represents part of the manufacturer’ s cost of distribution, which, like 
any other cost, the manufacturer usually desires to minimize. Accordingly, a manufacturer has no incentive 
to overcompensate retailers with unjust margins. As a general matter, therefore, a manufacturer will be 
inclined to adopt RPM only if the increase in demand resulting from enhanced services will offset a 
negative impact on demand of a higher retail price.
    Keeping in mind that RPM has economic dangers which may lead the restraint to be anticompetitive, the 
Supreme Court requires lower courts to be diligent in eliminating its anticompetitive use from the market 
when applying the rule of reason to RPM.22） The Court suggested certain factors which are relevant to the 
rule of reason inquiry. First of all, the Court stressed the importance of the number of manufacturers that 
utilize RPM in a given industry.23） According to the Court, an anticompetitive concern would not arise, in 
all likelihood, from the situation where only a few manufacturers lacking market power adopt RPM, for a 
manufacturer cartel then could be undercut by rival manufacturers. Likewise, a retailer cartel is not likely 
to happen when only a single manufacturer in a competitive market uses RPM, because interbrand 
competition would divert consumers to lower priced substitutes and eliminate any gains to retailers from 
their price fixing agreement over a single brand. By contrast, the Court noted that RPM should be 
examined more carefully if the practices were ubiquitous in a given industry.24） The second factor the 
Court regarded as important was the source of the restraint.25） If there is evidence retailers were the 
impetus for RPM, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a 
dominant, inefficient retailer, given that the interests of manufacturers and consumers are, in general, 
aligned with respect to retailer profit margins. As for the manufacturer-driven RPM, which was adopted by 
a manufacturer independently of retailer pressure, the Court considered the restraint to be less likely to 
cause anticompetitive concern. Thirdly, the Court stated that market power was also an important factor to 
be taken into consideration, because a dominant manufacturer or retailer could abuse RPM for 
anticompetitive purposes and cause adverse effects on competition when they have market power.26） On 
the contrary, both manufacturer and retailer which lack market power are not likely to bring about serious 
anticompetitive consequences even if they adopt RPM. In situation where a retailer lacks market power, 
manufacturers can have options to sell their products through rival retailers. Similarly, when a 
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manufacturer without market power adopts RPM, there is less likelihood it can use the practice to keep its 
competitors away from distributors in facing interbrand competition.
    In conclusion, the Supreme Court confirmed that the rule of reason was designed and used to eliminate 
anticompetitive restraints from the market and to promote procompetitive ones. The Court opined that 
courts can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule of reason operates to achieve the purpose of 
providing more guidance to businesses, and asserted that the courts would be able to do this as they gain 
experience presiding over RPM cases and actually applying the rule over the course of decisions.27）
C.  Dissent 28）
    While recognizing potential anticompetitive consequences, like higher retail prices or stifling of the 
development of more efficient retailing models, the dissenting opinion in Leegin asserted that there are 
circumstances when RPM will benefit competition in terms of new entry and prevention of ‘free-riding’. 
The dissent cast doubt on the frequency of the benefits, stating that it was not significant enough to justify 
overturning the long-lasting per se rule. Apart from new entry, which should be taken into consideration 
even under the per se rule it supports, the dissent raised the question of how often the ‘free-riding’ 
problem becomes serious enough to deter dealer investment.29） The dissent maintained that sometimes 
‘free-riding’ could happen in reality, but that it did not take place so often in the economy where firms sell 
complex technical equipment to consumers.
    The dissent also pointed out that it was not very easy for courts to identify instances in which the 
benefits of RPM are likely to outweigh potential harms, showing the difficulty of identifying who, producer 
or dealer, is the driving force behind any given RPM agreement, and the difficulty of determining when 
and where ‘free-riding’ is serious enough to warrant legal protection.30） Given the difficulties of the 
problem, the dissent emphasized that the question before the Court was not ‘what should be the rule’  
starting from scratch, but rather ‘whether it was necessary to change a clear and simple per se rule that 
had been applied by courts for a long time’.31）
    In the end, the dissent concluded that, in the absence of substantial change in economy, which might 
have helped to support the majority’ s argument, there was no ground for abandoning a well-established 
antitrust rule of per se illegality, upon which untold numbers of business decisions had relied for nearly a 
century.32）
Ⅱ．POST-LEEGIN MOVEMENT
A.  Federal Antitrust Enforcers
    In Leegin, as enforcers of the federal antitrust laws, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) jointly filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the petitioner, Leegin, 
concluding that the per se rule against RPM should be abandoned, and Dr. Miles should be overruled.33） 
Considering that the effects of RPM could be either anticompetitive or procompetitive depending on the 
fact in a given case, the brief insisted that the per se rule established in Dr. Miles was clearly inappropriate. 
Moreover, the brief stated that, in light of modern antitrust principles and experiences backed by 
economic analysis, there was no basis for subjecting RPM to per se analysis while analyzing non-price 
vertical restraints and maximum RPM under the rule of reason, citing Sylvania34） and Khan.35）
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    After Leegin, FTC modified a previous consent order36） and released Nine West Footwear Corporation 
(former Nine West Group Inc., hereinafter, “Nine West”) from the prohibition of adopting RPM policy,37） 
by examining factors identified by Leegin as potentially anticompetitive. FTC also held a series of public 
workshops in February and May 2009 in order to explore “how to best distinguish between uses of RPM 
that benefit consumers and those that do not.”38） DOJ expressed remarks supporting Leegin and 
suggesting a new structured approach for RPM under the rule of reason. In addition, the federal enforcers 
submitted a paper, which reviewed the theoretical and empirical research on the effects of RPM, to OECD 
Roundtable on Competition Policy. The federal enforcers confirmed that the shift to a rule of reason 
treatment declared by Leegin had the potential to create substantial benefits for consumers.39）
1.  Nine West
    On October 30, 2007, about four months later Leegin, Nine West filed a petition to reopen and modify the 
consent order issued by FTC on April 11, 2000. According to the FTC complaint in 2000, Nine West 
engaged in contracts, combinations, or agreements with certain of its retailers in connection with the sale 
and distribution of Nine West branded products (women’ s shoes etc.) in order to fix, raise, maintain or 
stabilize the retail prices at which its products were advertised and sold to consumers. To put it concretely, 
Nine West adopted pricing policies governing the retail sale of its product and distributed “off limits” or 
“non-promote” lists of shoes, including shoes that could not be promoted outside of defined periods of 
clearance sale. Retailers communicated to Nine West their agreement to adhere to these pricing policies. 
Nine West shared revisions of these pricing policies with certain of its dealers prior to implementation of 
such revised polices for the purpose of soliciting input as to shoes that should, or should not, be included 
on the revised lists. Nine West also added or removed shoes from the coverage of these policies as well as 
extended or limited the periods of clearance sale for shoes covered by the policies at the request of its 
dealers. Moreover, Nine West negotiated individualized exemptions from the coverage of its policies for 
certain dealers, and often conditioned its agreement in those cases on the condition that the dealers would 
not advertise the newly-negotiated retail price. In response to violations of its pricing policies by some of 
its dealers, Nine West suspended shipments to the violating dealers for a limited period, with the tacit 
understanding that shipments would resume if Nine West discovered no further violation of the policy in 
the meantime, or if the dealers promised not to violate the policy again in the future. FTC asserted that, in 
recognizing the facts that prices to consumers of Nine West products increased and price competition 
among retailers decreased, the effect of the practices between Nine West and its dealers restrained trade 
unreasonably, hindered competition in the sale of women’ s footwear in the United States, and deprived 
consumers of the benefits of competition, in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.40）
    The 2000 FTC order prohibited Nine West from fixing, controlling or maintaining the resale price at 
which any dealer may advertise, promote, offer for sell or sell any Nine West products. The order also 
prevented Nine West from requiring, coercing, or otherwise securing a commitment from any dealer to 
maintain a resale price for its products. In addition, the order imposed a ten-year ban on Nine West 
adopting, maintaining, enforcing or threatening any policy that the dealer is subject to warning or 
suspension or termination if it sells, promotes, advertises Nine West products below any retail price 
designed by Nine West. The ten-year ban imposed on Nine West included not to adopt, maintain, enforce, 
or threaten any policy that dealers will be subject to a greater sanction if it continues or renews selling, 
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offering for sale, promoting or advertising any Nine West products below any resale price designed by 
Nine West.
    In its petition, Nine West argued that the relief it was seeking was required by changed conditions of law 
and public interest. Nine West asserted that the Supreme Court’ s decision in Leegin revamped antitrust 
law and required FTC, in light of the change in the law, to reopen the order and set aside its prohibitions as 
‘no longer necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ under the new law. As for public interest, Nine West highlighted 
its competitive disadvantage compared with other competitors which may use RPM after Leegin.
    The Act allowed FTC to reopen an order to consider whether it should be modified once the respondent 
was able to make a satisfactory showing that changed conditions of law or fact required such 
modification.41） According to precedents, a satisfactory showing sufficient to require reopening is made 
when a request to reopen identifies sufficient change in circumstances and shows that the changes 
eliminate the need for the order, or make continued application of it inequitable or harmful to competition. 
FTC had previously reopened and modified the order in Sharp Electronics Corporation42） based on the 
change of law enunciated in Sylvania,43） which changed the test for territorial restraints (non-price 
vertical restraints) from per se condemnation to the rule of reason.
    As an analytical framework in the early stage after Leegin, FTC weighed certain factors (identified by the 
Supreme Court as a helpful guide) to begin an assessment of RPM and its relevance to the Nine-West 
situation. According to the Court, RPM could be harmful to competition when retailers are the source of 
RPM, when RPM are ubiquitous in the industry, and when a manufacturer or retailer is a dominant player 
in the market.44） In the end, FTC determined that Nine West had made satisfactory showing that changes 
in law caused by Leegin required reopening and modifying the order which had prohibited Nine West from 
entering into RPM arrangements with its retailers. As for the procompetitive effects of its use of RPM, 
Nine West could not provide any specific, empirical evidence indicating that it was prohibited from 
engaging in RPM.
    Although FTC granted Nine West’ s petition based on the fact that Nine West lacked market power and 
that Nine West itself was the source of RPM, thus allowing Nine West to adopt RPM policy as a result, it 
recognized the necessity to monitor the effects of Nine West’ s use of RPM because the circumstances in 
the market could change. FTC stated that monitoring the effects of the RPM would also contribute to 
ensuring the procompetitive ef ficiency Nine West could not demonstrate in its petition. For those 
purposes, Nine West was required to file a report with FTC one, three, and five years after the order had 
been modified and this report would provide information describing Nine West’ s use of RPM and its effect 
on its price and output.
2.  DOJ’ s Remarks on Leegin
    The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has also been active in addressing Leegin. It 
expresses a support for Leegin, analyzes the standards by Leegin, and proposes a new structured rule-of-
reason approach for RPM. For example, Thomas Barnett, who headed the Antitrust Division when the 
Supreme Court declared the departure from per se condemnation for RPM in Leegin, addressed the 
Federalist Society highlighting that economic scholarship and the Court’ s more recent decisions had 
thoroughly undermined the bases for Dr. Miles opinion.45） The former Assistant Attorney General also 
pointed out the importance of the interbrand competition, which can be promoted by RPM, observing that 
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the per se rule is appropriate only for conduct that is almost invariably anticompetitive.
    Then there are the comments of Christine Varney who was in charge of the Antitrust Division. In her 
remarks before the National Association of Attorneys General, Varney explained how the courts might 
apply a structured rule-of-reason analysis, stating that a careful reading of Leegin suggests a structured 
application of the rule of reason tailored to the plaintiff’ s theory of how RPM is anticompetitive in the case 
at hand.46） According to her argument, a preliminary showing of the existence of the arrangement, scope 
of its operation, and the presence of structural conditions under which RPM is likely to be anticompetitive 
might well be sufficient to establish the illegality.47） She maintained that under this approach, the burden 
of proof would shift to the defendant to demonstrate either that its RPM was actually procompetitive or that 
the plaintiff’ s characterizations of the marketplace were erroneous. At least, the defendant would have to 
establish that it adopted RPM to enhance its success in competing with rivals and that RPM was a 
reasonable method for accomplishing its procompetitive purposes.48） The remarks were that the use of a 
structured rule of reason was consistent with NCAA49）  and Indiana Federation of Dentists,50） in which the 
Supreme Court made clear that the rule of reason did not open the field widely to include any argument in 
favor of a challenged restraint, but permitted the Court to engage in a truncated review when the practice 
at issue was plainly anticompetitive and did not appear to have any countervailing competitive virtue.51）
    Keeping in mind that the structured rule-of-reason approach for RPM is consistent with modern 
development of antitrust analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Assistant Attorney General 
detailed the elements that a plaintiff could use to establish a prima facie showing to shift the burden to 
defendants, along with the scenarios indicated by Leegin as potentially anticompetitive.
    In case of a manufacturer-driven RPM, the arrangement can be anticompetitive when the RPM is used 
to facilitate manufacturer collusion by helping a cartel police their agreement. In this situation, the burden 
will shift to the defendants where: a majority of sales in the market are covered by RPM; market structure 
is conducive to price coordination; RPM is significantly useful to identify cheating. Manufacturer-driven 
RPM can also be anticompetitive when a dominant manufacturer uses RPM to guarantee large margins to 
retailers and make them unwilling to carry the products of small rivals or new entrants. In this situation, 
the following are required to make the case prima facie illegal: the manufacturer has dominant market 
position; its RPM contracts cover a substantial portion of distribution outlets; RPM has significant 
foreclosure effect that impacted an actual rival.
    As for retailer-driven RPM, it is obvious that the greater concern was shown by Leegin. The former 
Assistant Attorney General points out that all five potential procompetitive uses of RPM identified by 
Leegin involve benefit to manufacturers, not retailers, concluding that a plaintiff presenting substantial 
evidence that retailer coercion was responsible for RPM has made a prima facie showing of anticompetitive 
effects. Under retailer exclusion theory, a retailer with significant market power, or several retailers acting 
together, could coerce important manufacturers to institute RPM and thereby prevent price competition 
from discounters. In this situation, the following are required to establish a prima facie showing of 
anticompetitiveness: the retailers have sufficient market power; coercion by retailers results in RPM 
covering most of the market; RPM plausibly has a significant exclusionary effect that impacted an actual 
rival. In addition, under retailer collusion theory, an agreement by retailers to fix prices can be 
implemented and policed by coercing sufficient manufacturers to use RPM consistent with the retailer 
cartel agreement. In this situation, prima facie showing of anticompetitive effects, which shift the burden 
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to defendant, consist of the fact that RPM is used pervasively - at least 50 percent of the sale in the market, 
that RPM was instituted by retailer coercion, and that retailer collusion could not be thwarted by 
manufacturers. For this third element, extensive reliance on well-established retailers carrying the 
products of many manufacturers should be sufficient.
3.  Written Submission to OECD Roundtable on RPM
    In October 2008, the OECD Competition Committee discussed the positive and negative effects of RPM, 
in which U. S. delegates submitted a paper representing their perspectives on antitrust enforcement in the 
U.S.. After concluding that both theoretical economic literatures related to RPM and available empirical 
evidence, regarding the effects of RPM, support an analysis of RPM under the rule of reason, the federal 
enforcers identify some practical points for enforcing the rule. At first, they examine the possibility of 
manufacturer or retailer cartel by checking whether RPM is widespread in the industry in question. If few 
manufacturers have RPM agreements in place with their retailers, or if few retailers enter into RPM 
agreement with a given manufacturer, then the enforcers are of the opinion that RPM does not contribute 
to help enforce a cartel.52） Next, they evaluate whether the manufacturer in question possesses meaningful 
market power in the relevant market. If it does not, they doubt that retailer cartel will succeed because the 
retailer car tel might not be able to earn supracompetitive profits in facing vigorous interbrand 
competition.53） The absence of market power would also prevent a manufacturer from using RPM in an 
exclusive fashion, because the presence of robust competition from other brands enables consumers to 
switch to one of the alternatives. Therefore, they assume that a manufacturer’ s decision to adopt RPM in a 
competitive market is likely to reflect an effort to improve its ability to compete.54）
    Although the federal enforcers state that the existence of market power is a useful screen to determine 
whether a closer scrutiny of the actual effects of RPM on consumers is warranted, they note that it would 
be inappropriate to conclude merely from a finding that the manufacturer possessed market power, that its 
use of RPM is likely to harm consumers.55） In this case, reliable evidence - for example, a finding that 
RPM caused sales of the manufacturer’ s product to increase - would be crucial to the assessment of its 
competitive effect.56） The fact that RPM contributed to sales increase would also be strong evidence 
against hypothesis that its purpose was to sustain a cartel among either retailers or manufacturers.57）
    As for the frequent concern that RPM will lead to higher prices for consumers, the paper submitted to 
OECD points out that a direct examination of the effect of RPM on retail prices would be useful and 
important to help discern whether this is indeed the case, and if so, in which circumstances.58） According 
to the paper, a manufacturer might choose to lower price if the additional demand it expected from 
enhanced retail services enabled it to exploit economies of scale more fully.59） And if an increase in retailer 
services is associated with an increase in the price elasticity of demand, RPM can lead to lower retail 
prices. The paper states that a careful analysis would make it possible to establish that RPM had this effect 
in practice.60） Furthermore, the paper notes that it would be inappropriate to conclude that consumers had 
been harmed based on the evidential fact that RPM led to a higher retail price for a product.61） Considering 
that evidence of RPM’ s effect on quantity is far more probative than price evidence for establishing its 
effect on consumer welfare, the enforcers observe that consumers could be better off if the higher retail 
price created an incentive for retailers to provide valuable services or higher quality.62） They also regard 
the sales increase, despite price increase, as evidence that consumers benefited from increased services.63）
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B.  Federal Cases
    Although still remaining small in number, some lower courts have encountered RPM-related cases after 
Leegin and have considered applying the rule of reason to RPM. The following are six relevant cases other 
than the remand decisions of Leegin.
1.  Spahr  64）
    In the class action complaint against Leegin, two Tennessee residents who purchased Brighton products 
manufactured by Leegin alleged that Leegin coerced or entered into agreements with retailers to 
implement RPM in order to stabilize prices for its products, thereby keeping prices at supracompetitive 
levels and denying consumers the benefit of a free market. Given that the Brighton products were unique 
and distinct products characterized by an inelasticity of demand and recognition by the public and the 
industry as a whole, the plaintif fs alleged that the relevant product market was the market for the 
manufacture, distribution and/or sale of Brighton products. The plaintif fs also defined the relevant 
geographic market as the United States based on the fact Brighton products were available in 
approximately 6,000 stores located from coast to coast. According to the complaint, Leegin had a 
substantial and/or dominant market share in the above-mentioned relevant market. As for the effects of 
Leegin’ s conduct, the plaintiffs alleged that they and other class members were forced to pay artificially 
high, anticompetitive prices for Brighton products without benefit from free and open competition in the 
market.
    The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found that the plaintif fs’ 
definition of the relevant product market is deficient and could not be cured for surviving the defendant’ s 
motion to dismiss, recognizing that other product lines of women’ s accessories made by other 
manufacturers were reasonably interchangeable substitutes for Brighton products.65） The district court 
also pointed out the insufficiency of the plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that Brighton products were 
distinct products characterized by an inelasticity of demand.66） Therefore, in accordance with Twombly, 67） 
which required a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to prove sufficient facts and reasoning as a 
threshold of plausibility for surviving motion to dismiss, the district court noted, that the plaintiffs should 
have alleged Brighton products’ inelasticity of demand with enough reasons and explanations.68） As an 
anticompetitive effect of RPM, the plaintiffs alleged only that agreements at issue resulted in higher prices 
for Brighton products. The district court, however, stated that higher prices alone, absent a further 
showing of anticompetitive conduct, were not sufficient evidence of the anticompetitive effect of RPM, 
citing the Supreme Court’ s decision in Leegin.69） Among the circumstances under which higher prices 
might be anticompetitive, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant and its retailers formed a ‘retailer 
cartel’ through the dual distribution system, and hoped that this allegation would allow them to withstand 
the defendant’ s motion to dismiss. But the Leegin Court had defined a ‘retailer cartel’ as an arrangement 
to fix prices and then compel a manufacturer to aid the unlawful arrangement with RPM.70） Considering 
the plaintif fs’ allegation that  the defendant coerced retailers and forced upon retailers the RPM 
agreements instead of utilizing RPM as an organizer of price-fixing cartel by retailers, the district court 
decided that the plaintiffs did not properly allege a ‘retailer cartel’ as defined by the Supreme Court.71） In 
the end, the district court dismissed the complaint that Leegin’ s RPM violated the Sherman Act on the 
ground that the plaintiffs did not plausibly plead either a relevant market or anticompetitive effect of RPM 
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agreements at issue.72） The appeal by the plaintiffs to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit was dismissed on the same reasoning.
2.  Jacobs 73）
    Defendants, Tempur-Pedic North America, Inc. along with its parent corporation, Tempur-Pedic 
International, Inc. (hereinafter collectively “TPX”) manufactured visco-elastic foam mattresses and sold 
them to consumers nationwide through distributors and its own website. The sales of the foam mattresses 
by TPX accounted for 80 to 90 percent of the visco-elastic foam mattresses sold in the United States. In 
addition to entering into RPM agreements with distributors, TPX also sold mattresses directly to 
consumers through its website at the same prices it agreed with its distributors. Plaintiffs, Benny and 
Wanda Jacobs (“Jacobs”)74） purchased a Tempur-Pedic mattress from a TPX distributor in Rome, Georgia 
at a price equal to or above the minimum price stated in the distributor’ s agreement with TPX. Later, 
Jacobs brought an antitrust action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, 
alleging that the price at which they purchased the mattresses were artificially raised by the arrangements 
between TPX and its distributors in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, 
TPX violated the antitrust law by enforcing RPM agreements with its distributors and by engaging with its 
distributors in horizontal price fixing. Jacobs sought treble damages against TPX on behalf of all who had 
purchased Tempur-Pedic mattresses in the United States, as well as an injunction against TPX’ s further 
implementation of these agreements.
    First of all, the district court referred to Twombly as principal guidance for considering TPX’ s motion to 
dismiss in the case at issue.75） In Twombly, the Supreme Court specifically required a plaintiff to allege 
enough factual matter that would suggest plausible ground to infer an antitrust violation in order to survive 
a motion to dismiss.76） The district court then analyzed the anticompetitive effect of  TPX’ s conduct on the 
relevant market, stating that the plaintiffs must define the relevant market and establish TPX’ s power in 
that market to prove that TPX’ s behavior had potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.77） With 
respect to actual detrimental effects on competition, Jacobs alleged in their complaint that TPX harmed the 
plaintiffs by selling its products at the artificially elevated prices as a result of RPM agreements with 
distributors, eliminating the price competition in the sales of Tempur-Pedic mattresses. The district court, 
however, concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to make a plausible showing of actual 
harm, and regarded their allegations as precisely the kind of “labels and conclusions” and “formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that the Supreme Court condemned in Twombly.78） For the 
purpose of proving potential anticompetitive effects, Jacobs alleged that visco-elastic foam mattresses 
constituted the relevant product market by themselves, while the defendants argued that the relevant 
product market was simply the mattress market without distinction between traditional innerspring 
mattresses and non-traditional mattresses which include visco-elastic foam mattresses. Relying on Du 
Pont79）, which defined the relevant product market based on the product’ s interchangeability on use with 
alternatives, the district court held that the relevant product market was not simply visco-elastic foam 
mattress but, instead, was mattress market in general as argued by TPX.80） According to the court, the 
TPX’ s non-traditional mattresses may be very different from traditional innerspring mattresses, but they 
are still products on which people sleep.81） By failing to define ‘relevant market’ for the purpose of this 
case, the Jacobs could not plausibly plead anticompetitive effect of TPX’ s conduct on the relevant market. 
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Finally, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege facts that would show 
plausible grounds from which to infer an antitrust violation.82）
    After reviewing the district court’ s order de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”) af firmed the ruling of the district court that Jacobs’ relevant market 
allegations fell short of Twombly’ s requirement.83） Given the responsibility under Twombly to plead a 
plausibly defined relevant product market, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that Jacobs’ conclusory 
allegation that the foam mattresses constituted, by themselves, a separate and distinct submarket of the 
larger mattress market, lacked sufficient reasoning and explanations based on evidence of the products’ 
cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable substitutability of the products.84） Also, in response to the 
allegations that the foam mattresses are more expensive than traditional innerspring mattresses and they 
have unique attributes, the Eleventh Circuit stated that Jacobs did not indicate the degree to which 
consumers prefer the foam mattresses to traditional mattresses because of these unique attributes and 
dif ferences in price.85） Moreover, the court noted that Jacobs should have provided demonstrable 
empirical evidence to support the plaintiffs’ definition of the alleged submarket.86）
    In terms of horizontal restraint claim that TPX, as a distributor, entered into a horizontal price-fixing 
agreement with its distributors when selling mattresses directly to consumers through its website, the 
district court had dismissed the claim because courts generally have treated the dual distribution system 
as vertical rather than horizontal in nature, and also because Jacobs did not allege a freestanding 
horizontal arrangement between TPX and its distributors.87） The Eleventh Circuit drew two possible 
inferences from the fact that TPX and its distributors charged the same minimum price. The first inference 
was that an arrangement existed between TPX, as a distributor, and its distributors in the guise of RPM 
agreements. Although Jacobs alleged that TPX would tacitly collude with its distributors through the RPM 
agreements, the Eleventh Circuit denied the argument, stating that tacit collusion is not in itself unlawful 
without any further allegation that TPX and its distributors signaled, in some way, each other on how and 
when to maintain or adjust prices.88） The second inference the court made was that TPX and its 
distributors set prices independently of each other after fully taking into consideration the economic sense 
to do so. According to the court, it suited the distributors’ independent economic interest to maintain 
prices at the level TPX set in its website, given the risk of losing significant amounts of business by raising 
their prices above TPX’ s resale price.89） The Eleventh Circuit also observed that TPX, as a distributor, 
would not set its price under the minimum resale price it imposed on its distributors, because doing so 
would drive the distributors out of business by making consumers switch to purchasing Temper-Pedic 
mattresses from TPX’ s website.90） Considering that the distributors are intended and expected to provide 
consumers with first-hand information, which is critically important for customers to make a purchasing 
decision about an item on which they will spend one-third of their lives, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it 
would not make any economic sense for TPX to undercut the minimum prices it asks distributors to 
maintain.91） Under the pleading standard of Twombly, the court pointed out that Jacobs had the burden to 
present allegations showing why it was more plausible that TPX and its distributors, who were assumed to 
be rational actors acting in their self-interest, would rather enter into an illegal price-fixing agreement to 
reach the same result realized by purely rational profit-maximizing behavior.92） Taking into consideration 
the potential costs of fixing prices with its distributors, the court also observed that the benefits that TPX 
and its distributors would realize by engaging in illegal horizontal price-fixing would equal nothing, 
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especially where independent economic activity would bring the participants the same result with none of 
the costs.93）
    The dissenting opinion of the court of appeals argued that the majority went too far when it interpreted 
Twombly to essentially require Jacobs to include actual evidence of cross-elasticity of demand or other 
indications of price sensitivity in pleading the relevant product market, given the fact that product market 
analysis was detailed and complicated and could not be done easily on a motion to dismiss, absent access 
to discovery.94） The dissent also pointed out that the majority’ s demand for empirical evidence at the 
pleading stage of litigation was improper and carried Twombly too far against the statement of the Supreme 
Court’ s decision that a complaint did not need detailed factual allegations.95）
3.  Toledo Mack96）
    Defendant, Mack Trucks, Inc. (“Mack”) manufactured a variety of heavy-duty trucks, and distributed 
its products primarily through a nationwide network of authorized dealers. Each dealer was assigned a 
geographic region called an “Area of Responsibility” (“AOR”), but the AOR was not exclusive and dealers 
were contractually free to sell anywhere in the United States. Plaintiff, Toledo Mack Sales and Service, Inc. 
(“Toledo Mack”), an authorized Mack dealer located in Toledo, Ohio, had aggressively pursued its low-
price sales strategy throughout the country until Mack terminated Toledo Mack’ s status as an authorized 
dealer, due to competing on price against other Mack dealers for sales in other dealer’ s AORs. Most of 
Mack’ s trucks were made to order with various chassis, engines, and transmission options, and a 
transaction-specific discount known as “sales assistance”was to be given to any dealer who submitted to 
Mack a list of specification from a potential customer. The amount of sales assistance that Mack offered a 
dealer on a particular transaction varied according to the nature of the relationship between the dealer and 
the customer, the number of trucks ordered, potential competition, and other factors.97） The greater the 
discount that Mack provided to the dealer, the lower the price that the dealer could profitably charge the 
customer. Therefore, the sales assistance played an important role when dealers prepared prices for 
customers. Because potential customers would often solicit bids from multiple Mack dealers as well as 
from Mack’ s competitors, Mack dealers competed against other manufacturers’ dealers and amongst 
themselves.
    In its complaint before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Toledo 
Mack alleged, as a Sherman Act claim, that Mack conspired with its dealers to restrain price competition 
and allocated markets by restricting sales assistance to sales occurring only within a dealer’ s AOR. 
According to the complaint, this arrangement had the purpose and effect of severely impairing the ability 
of Mack dealers, especially discount dealers like Toledo Mack, to compete with other Mack dealers for the 
sales outside of their AORs. In response to the complaint, Mack moved for summary judgment claiming 
that Toledo Mack’ s evidence was insufficient to show concerted action between Mack and its dealers. The 
district court found that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case, and the court finally judged, 
in accordance with the verdict of the jury, in favor of defendant Mack as against Toledo Mack’ s claim on 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.98）
    In its appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”), Toledo Mack 
argued that individual Mack dealers entered into horizontal “gentlemen’ s agreements” to fix prices and 
that Mack agreed with its dealers to support that conspiracy through vertical agreements denying sales 
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assistance to any dealer who sought to compete against other Mack dealers on price. In this regard, the 
Third Circuit held that Toledo Mack presented several pieces of direct evidence for the existence of 
horizontal agreements among Mack dealers not to compete with each other.99） Similarly, with respect to 
the vertical agreements, the Third Circuit held that Toledo Mack presented direct evidence that Mack 
agreed with its dealers to support the dealers’ illegal horizontal conspiracy to control prices by refusing to 
offer sales assistance to dealers who sought to sell outside their AORs.100） Moreover, the court held that 
Toledo Mack presented evidence that Mack’ s policy denying sales assistance to dealers on sales outside 
their AORs was the result of collaboration between Mack and its dealers through the vertical agreements 
above, which were initiated at the request of dealers.
    Citing Leegin, the Third Circuit confirmed that the rule-of-reason analysis applied even when, as in this 
case, the plaintiff alleged that the purpose of the vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its dealer 
was to support illegal horizontal agreements between multiple dealers.101） In addition, the Third Circuit 
pointed out two possibly illegal situations clarified in Leegin, which were particularly relevant to Toledo 
Mack’ s appeal. Those were the source of the restraint and the dominance of a manufacturer or retailer in 
the relevant market. According to Leegin, if there was evidence that retailers were the impetus for a 
vertical restraint, there was a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitated a retailer cartel.102） Likewise, if 
a dominant manufacturer or retailer had market power, RPM could be abused for anticompetitive purposes 
and would cause serious concerns regarding competition.103） Besides noting that Toledo Mack produced 
evidence that the vertical agreements were the result of dealer pressure, the Third Circuit held that Mack 
had power in both conventional straight truck market and low cab-over-engine truck market.104） 
According to the court, Toledo Mack succeeded in defining the markets at issue and in demonstrating 
Mack’ s market power in the relevant markets by presenting expert testimony.105） Finally, applying the 
rule-of-reason analysis to Toledo Mack’ s claim, the Third Circuit concluded that Toledo Mack presented 
sufficient evidence of an illegal agreement between Mack and its dealers, for a jury to find for Toledo 
Mack, vacating and remanding the district court’ s decision on the Sherman Act claim.106）
4.  Babyage107）
    Defendant, Babies ‘R’ Us (“BRU”) is a large retailer of baby and juvenile products including strollers, 
high chairs, breast pumps, bedding, car seats and infant carriers. It carries products manufactured by 
Britax, Peg Perego, Medela, Maclaren, Kids Line, Regal Lager, and Baby Bjorn (the “manufacturers”). 
Smaller retailers like Babyage, and Baby Club (the “retailers”) competed with BRU by undercutting 
BRU’ s prices in order to increase their sales volume. This undercutting ceased when the manufacturers 
began to require the retailers to sell their products at or above a certain price. The retailers and various 
consumers (the “consumers”) brought an antitrust action against BRU and the manufacturers in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that BRU orchestrated the 
arrangements in order to restrain competition, and manufacturers agreed to take RPM policies in the deal 
with their retailers in violation of the Sherman Act.108） As a result, the plaintiffs argued that they had paid 
more for baby products because of the RPM policies taken by the manufacturers. In response, BRU and 
the manufacturers moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.
    First of all, the district court confirmed the Supreme Court’ s support of the pleading standard in 
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Twombly, that is, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must provide a 
statement which has enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief above a speculative level.109） 
As for Section 1 of the Sherman Act claim, the district court noted, in accordance with Twombly and the 
precedents in the Third Circuit, that the plaintiffs must state their claim with enough factual matter taken 
as true to suggest (1) a market or markets in which competition has been harmed, (2) concerted action 
involving (a) BRU and each manufacturer and (b) each manufacturer and various retailers, (3) the 
anticompetitive nature of the concerted action, and (4) a causal nexus between the concerted action and 
the plaintiffs’ particular injuries.110）
    With respect to relevant market, the plaintiffs alleged that separate markets of retail sales of high-end 
baby and juvenile products made by manufacturers constituted several relevant markets in this case. 
Taking into consideration both reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand, the district 
court held that the plaintiffs succeeded in pleading that the manufacturers would not, by raising prices for 
their respective relevant high-end baby and juvenile products a small but significant non-transitory 
amount, lose sufficient sales to make such a price increase unprofitable.111） According to the court, this in 
turn meant that the plaintif fs clearly accounted for all economically substitutable products based on 
reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand. Finding that the plaintiffs had stated enough 
facts to suggest the existence of several high-end baby and juvenile products’ markets in which 
competition has been harmed, the district court declared the clearance of Twombly standard as to relevant 
market.112）
    As for concerted action, the district court stated the necessity for the plaintiffs to plead two interrelated 
types of concerted action in order to link BRU’ s actions with the RPM policies.113） Those were concerted 
action between BRU and each manufacturer, and concerted action between each manufacturer and that 
manufacturer’ s retailers. In order to plead concerted action between BRU and each manufacturer, the 
plaintiffs claimed parallel conduct coupled with circumstances that tended to negate the possibility that 
BRU and each manufacturer acted independently. While some factors are widely recognized as useful to 
negate the possibility of participants’ independence, the plaintiffs had evidence to show that parallel 
conduct in the form of imposition of RPM policies, which were contrary to each manufacturer’ s 
independent economic self-interest, were taken by the manufacturers. The plaintiffs also alleged that BRU 
wielded significant power over each manufacturer because the manufacturers relied on BRU’ s orders to 
remain economically viable. Moreover, the plaintiffs also alleged that BRU threatened each manufacturer 
with severe repercussions in order to induce each manufacturer to impose RPM policies on its retailers. 
According to the district court, these assertions took the concerted-action allegations beyond mere 
parallel conduct and negated other potential explanations for the striking parallelism, which constituted 
enough heft to raise the satisfaction of the concerted-action element of the claim above a speculative 
level.114） In addition to concerted action between BRU and each manufacturer, the plaintif fs alleged 
concerted action between each manufacturer and its retailers in the form of RPM agreements, which were 
accepted in the end by the district court as having enough fact to raise the satisfaction of the concerted-
action element of the claim above a speculative level.115）
    Relying on Indiana Federation of Dentists,116） the district court stated that the plaintiffs could allege the 
anticompetitive nature of the concerted action by alleging actual harm to competition.117） According to 
judicial precedents in the Third Circuit within which the district court sits, hallmarks of such actual harm 
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include an increase in retail prices above competitive level, a reduction in output below competitive level, 
and deterioration in quality and service.118） The district court stated that the plaintif fs succeeded in 
pleading enough facts to suggest the concerted action was anticompetitive by alleging, with evidence, that 
the RPM raised retail prices for the manufacturers’ products beyond competitive level, reduced the output 
of the products lower than competitive level, and deteriorated customer service.119） Furthermore, the 
district court pointed out that harm to intrabrand competition should be examined carefully in this case in 
accordance with Leegin because BRU was a dominant retailer and the RPM at issue was initiated by the 
dominant retailer contrary to each manufacturer’ s independent economic self-interest.120） Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the allegations far exceeded a conclusory accusation of anticompetitive effect, and 
constituted the heft required by Twombly to raise the satisfaction of anticompetitive effects of the case 
beyond mere speculation.121）
    The plaintif fs also succeeded in pleading the causal relationship between their injuries and the 
defendants’ conducts by alleging that the injuries were caused by BRU’ s RPM scheme rather than by 
ambient market conditions or other natural forces.122）
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.123）
5.  McDonough124） 
    In the class action against defendants, Toys “R” Us, Inc., the parent company of baby-product retail 
chain Babies “R” Us, Inc. (“BRU”), and baby-product manufacturers,125） thirteen consumers who had 
purchased the baby products alleged that BRU conspired with the manufacturers to restrict competition in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the plaintif fs alleged that BRU coerced the 
manufacturers into adopting vertical price policies designed to prevent retail discounting and then charged 
consumers higher prices.
    Defendant, retail giant Toys “R” Us, Inc. created BRU and opened several stores in 1996, hoping to 
capture the U.S. retail market for baby products, which had been dominated by small specialty stores. 
Unlike these stores, BRU carried many brands and all types of baby products at one location. By 
purchasing other retail stores, establishing many new stores year by year, and opening an online store, 
BRU became the dominant retailer of baby products in place of small specialty stores. However, BRU soon 
began facing tough price competition from internet retailers which offered huge discounts that other 
retailers could not match. To respond to this competition, BRU demanded that the manufacturers stop 
internet retailers from discounting their products by adopting RPM and banning internet-only retailing. 
Considering that BRU dominated this market, the plaintiffs alleged that the baby-product manufacturers 
were substantially forced to acquiesce to the BRU’ s demand.126）
    In terms of antitrust violation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
reviewed the case based on Leegin, which announced that vertical price restraints should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason because they could benefit interbrand competition. The Leegin Court mentioned 
cer tain factors that should be considered under the rule of reason for potential anticompetitive 
consequences of RPM while discussing three situations127） where RPM could benefit interbrand 
competition. One of the factors was the source of the restraints. In Leegin, the Supreme Court stated that if 
there was evidence retailers were the impetus for vertical restraint, there was a greater likelihood that the 
restraint would support a dominant, inefficient retailer.128） The Supreme Court also suggested that courts 
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consider whether the restraint-instigator had market power, stating that a retailer which had market 
power could abuse RPM to the extent that a serious concern in competition would arise.129）
    The district court confirmed that the Third Circuit, within which the district court sat, employed a 
burden-shifting analysis for the rule of reason.130） Under this approach, a plaintiff bore initial burden 
showing that an alleged arrangement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant 
markets. And the plaintiff could show that the defendant had the ability to raise prices above those that 
would prevail in a competitive market instead of showing the existence of actual anticompetitive effects. 
When the plaintif f met the initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or actual 
anticompetitive effects, the burden shifted to the  defendant to show that the challenged conduct promoted 
a sufficiently procompetitive objective. To rebut, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the restraint was not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective. In this case, the district court found that the plaintiffs 
offered evidence that BRU was a dominant retailer that coerced vertical restraints to prevent internet 
discounting.131） The court also found that the plaintiffs properly argued that because BRU coerced those 
restraints, there were only anticompetitive effects.132） Applying the Third Circuit’ s burden-shifting analysis 
to RPM, the district court was satisfied that the plaintiffs met their initial burden of proving the restraints’ 
anticompetitive effects.
6.  Valuepest 133）
    Defendants, Bayer CropScience LP and Bayer Corp. (hereinafter collectively “Bayer”) introduced a 
poisonous termiticide called “Premise” which was highly efficacious to kill termites, and gained market 
share since its introduction. Bayer initially sold its Premise-products to large termiticide distributors like 
Univar USA, Inc. (“Univar”). Univar and other distributors then resold the products to pest management 
professionals (“PMPs”), who provided pest control services to homeowners, as well as other individual 
customers. Univar and other distributors usually resold the products to PMPs such as plaintiffs, Valupest.
com of Charlotte, Inc. (“Valuepest”), National Pest Control, Inc., and Pest Pros, Inc. However, facing 
competition from Aventis CropScience LP (“Aventis”), which began distributing similar kind of non-
repellent termiticide “Termidor” through Univar and other distributors pursuant to non-exclusive agency 
agreements, Bayer began selling “Premise” through an agency program similar to that used by Aventis. 
According to the agency agreements, manufacturers were the sellers of termiticides to PMPs, retaining 
title to the termiticides in the possession of the distributor-agents until they were sold to PMPs, and were 
allowed to set the prices at which termiticides were sold to PMPs. The distributor-agents merely facilitated 
the transactions between manufacturers and PMPs, receiving commissions for the sales they facilitated. In 
the wake of acquisition of Aventis by Bayer, the FTC required Bayer to divest assets relating to fipronil, 
Termidor’ s active ingredient. BASF Corp. (“BASF”) acquired the fipronil assets from Bayer and since 
then manufactured and sold Termidor in the United States using agency agreements. The plaintiffs filed a 
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging 
that defendant manufacturers, Bayer and BASF, each engaged in RPMs with their termiticides products. 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. While the district court was considering these motions 
the Supreme Court was listening to arguments in Leegin, and while it ruled on the defendants’ motion, the 
district court decided to postpone ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion until Leegin was decided.134） In the end, 
the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that defendants’ contracts 
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with their distributors represented a genuine agency relationship that did not render liability under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.135）
    In their appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”), the 
plaintiffs insisted that after Leegin the agency defense under General Electric136） to a claim of RPM was no 
longer viable because the Leegin Court overruled General Electric. Examining the structure of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, the Fourth Circuit analyzed that General Electric addressed what types of relationship 
constituted agreements to set prices for purposes of the Sherman Act, while Leegin was concerned with 
whether such agreements, once proven, should be considered per se unlawful or evaluated under the rule 
of reason.137） The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the plaintiffs’ argument conflated the distinction between 
two elements - the existence of an agreement and the reasonableness of the agreement - required to 
prove liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.138） Accordingly, the court noted that no part of Leegin’ s 
reasoning casted the slightest bit of doubt on the underpinning rule of General Electric, which confirmed 
that a genuine agent relationship was not an agreement for antitrust purposes under the rule.139） In 
evaluating the relationship at issue, the court looked at the facts in General Electric. In that case, GE sold 
its lamps to consumers via a consignment arrangement with retail and wholesale merchants.140） Prices 
were set by GE, and the dealers received fixed commissions.141） GE retained title to the lamps in the 
possession of the agents until they were sold to actual consumers.142） The manufacturer also assumed the 
risk of loss from fire, flood, obsolescence, and price decline, paid the taxes on the lamps, and carried 
insurance on the stock.143） The agents were required to pay for all expenses related to storage, 
transportation, sale, and distribution of the lamps, and were responsible for lost or damage while in the 
agent’ s care.144） The agents collected payments from customers and remitted the proceeds to the 
manufacturer, less their commission.145） Specifically, the Supreme Court in General Electric stressed the 
fact that agents were not required to pay for the lamps until they had been sold to customers and that the 
title of the lamps passed directly from the manufacture to the consumer at the time of sale.146） The Court 
did not find the agents were obligated to pay for lost or damaged lamps or to pay for storage, 
transportation, sale, and distribution expenses inconsistent with a genuine agency relationship.147）
    The Fourth Circuit also cited Simpson148） as another major case regarding an agency defense to a claim 
of RPM. In that case, an oil company’ s scheme to set the resale price of its gasoline sold to customers by 
gas stations, was at issue. Under the purported consignment agreement, retailers received commissions 
on gasoline sold, the title to the consigned gasoline passed directly from the oil company to the consumer 
at the time of sale, and the oil company paid property taxes on the gasoline held by the retailers.149） But, 
unlike General Electric, the retailers were required to carry personal liability and property damage 
insurance and were responsible for virtually all losses of the gasoline in their possession.  As a result, the 
Supreme Court in Simpson held that the purported consignment agreement was not a genuine agent 
relationship which did not violate the Sherman Act, and therefore constituted unlawful RPM.151）
    In examining Bayer’ s and BASF’ s contracts with Univar, the Fourth Circuit found that both Bayer and 
BASF retained title on their respective products while in Univar’ s possession, and the defendants (not 
Univar) bore the risk of loss on their products until they were delivered into the hands of PMPs.152） 
Beyond the formal labels in the agreements, the court found that a number of facts supported the 
conclusion that the defendants bore the risk of loss of the substance.153） The court also found that the 
defendants used the agency sales method for legitimate business reasons, such as introducing an entirely 
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new product154） and staying competitive.155） Moreover, the court found that there was no evidence that the 
agency agreements were the product of coercion like those in Simpson.156） Unlike the gasoline retailers in 
Simpson, Univar was not dependent on the agency contracts for its livelihood, and distributors like Univar 
could actually adopt the agency sales method at their own will.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Leegin did not eliminate the agency 
defense to a claim of RPM and found that the agency relationship between the defendants and their 
distributors were genuine in this case.
C.  Federal Legislative Proposal
1.  Bills to Repeal Leegin
    As early as October 30, 2007, about four months after Leegin, a bi ll short-titled “Discount Pricing 
Consumer Protection Act” was introduced by Senator Kohl in the Senate of the United States.157） 
According to the bill, the purpose of the Act was to correct the Supreme Court’ s “mistaken” interpretation 
of the Sherman Act in Leegin, and to restore per se rule against RPM which had survived nearly a century 
after Dr. Miles. The bill’ s  intent was to negate the Leegin decision by adding after the first sentence of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act the following: “Any contract, combination, conspiracy or agreement setting a 
minimum price below which a product or service cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor 
shall violate this Act.”158） The simple rule made it clear that a manufacturer would unquestionably violate 
the Sherman Act if it entered into such an agreement with its retailers. The bill was read twice and referred 
to the Committee on the Judiciary, but afterwards no further action was taken. So, Senator Kohl decided to 
reintroduce the identical bill in the next Congress session.159） Although the second bill was reported 
favorably by the Committee and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar,160） it turned out to be dead at 
the end of Congress’ session. On the other hand, in the United States House of Representatives, “Discount 
Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009” was introduced by Representative Johnson in July 2009.161） The 
purpose and the contents of the bill were identical to those introduced in the Senate, aiming “[t]o restore 
the rule that agreements between manufacturers and retailers, distributors, or wholesalers to set the price 
below which the manufacturer’ s product or service cannot be sold, violates the Sherman Act.”162） The 
House bill was reported favorably by the Committee on the Judiciary and placed on the Union Calendar,163） 
but it also did not become law in the end.164） On January 25, 2011, Senator Kohl introduced, for the third 
time in three consecutive Congresses, the same bill which was discarded in the previous sessions.165）
    In his introductory remarks on measure, Senator Kohl stated several reasons for the legislation. At first, 
he pointed out the danger of allowing manufacturers to set minimum retail prices for the very existence of 
discounting and discount stores, as it would lead to higher prices for consumers, depriving discounters of 
opportunities to offer consumers a wide array of highly desired products at the most competitive prices.166） 
Considering the studies conducted by the DOJ in the 1960s, when so-called “fair trade” laws were enacted 
by many States, Senator Kohl warned that the higher prices caused by RPM would force consumers to pay 
a tremendous amount of money today, citing Justice Breyer’ s dissenting opinion in Leegin.167） Secondly, the 
Senator noted the experience of the last three years since Leegin, referring to the Wall Street Journal’ s 
report that more than 5,000 companies had implemented RPM policies, and a new business known as 
“internet monitors”, had materialized for companies that scour the Internet in search of retailers selling 
products at a bargain.168） Thirdly, in response to the argument that today’ s giant retailers have sufficient 
The End of the Leegin Saga and the Beginning of Development For the Rule of Reason in RPM Cases
Page:21無断転載禁止　
阪南論集　社会科学編 Vol. 47 No. 2
44
market power to fight manufacturer efforts to impose retail prices, Senator Kohl expressed his particular 
concern about the effect of the new rule permitting RPM on the next generation of discount retailers, who 
were still relatively small and weak in markets. Specifically, he stated as follows: “If new discount retailers 
can be prevented from selling products at a discount at the behest of an established retailer worried about 
the competition, we will imperil an essential element of retail competition so beneficial to consumers.”169） 
Fourthly, given that parties complaining about RPM are likely to be small discount stores or consumers 
with limited resources to engage in lengthy and complicated antitrust litigation, Senator Kohl pointed out a 
particular situation in which a plaintif f in an antitrust case would have to bear onerous burdens for 
establishing the anticompetitive effects of the RPM at issue.170） Lastly, Senator Kohl mentioned two 
extensive hearings, conducted by the Antitrust Subcommittee in the last two Congresses, into the Leegin 
decision and the likely effects of abolishing the ban on RPM.171） He noted, among other things, that both 
the former FTC Chairman172） and former FTC Commissioner173） strongly endorsed restoring the ban on 
RPM.174） Moreover, he referred to the statements of CEO of Syms Corp.175） and a Senior Executive of 
Burlington Coat Factory176）, both of which insisted that abolishing the rules against RPM would make it 
difficult for discounters like themselves to survive because it would be difficult to prove anticompetitive 
effects of RPM.177）
2.  Opposition to the Bills
    The attempt in the previous Congress to enact legislation to repeal the Leegin decision and reinstate per 
se ban on RPM, ended in the repor ts by the Committees on the Judiciary in both chambers of 
Congress.178） Each report respectively recommended that the bills do pass in the Senate or the House. 
However, the decisions were not made unanimously in both chambers of Congress. In the Senate report, 
following the majority views of the Committee similar to those stated by Senator Kohl in the bill’ s 
introduction, three Senators in the Committee passionately argued and facilitated a spirited discussion 
about how the antitrust laws should be shaped and applied to protect consumers from anticompetitive 
behavior, taking into consideration the Supreme Court’ s relative precedents and modern economics 
analysis of RPM.179）
    In the first place, the minority views casted doubt on the bill’ s blanket ban of RPM agreements, insisting 
that the per se rules in antitrust violations should be reserved only for manifestly anticompetitive conduct 
in light of the Supreme Court’ s precedents.180） They stated, citing Leegin, that per se rules were appropriate 
only if court could predict with confidence that the practice at issue would be invalidated in all or almost all 
instances under the ordinary rule-of-reason antitrust analysis.181） They continued, citing Business 
Electronics,182） that such per se rules had been traditionally confined to restraints that would be always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.183） In addition, considering the guiding 
principle shown in Sylvania184）  that a departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based on 
demonstrable economic effect rather than formalistic line drawing, they repeated Leegin, which stated that 
the Supreme Court found that per se rules were appropriate only after courts had considerable experience 
with the type of restraint at issue.185） Furthermore, citing Kahn,186） they confirmed that the Supreme Court 
had appropriately been reluctant to adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of 
business relationship where the economic impact of certain practices was not immediately obvious.187） In 
terms of the Leegin decision, they found that the Supreme Court reviewed a considerable body of antitrust 
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economic literature dealing with RPM and concluded that the per se rule of Dr. Miles was not 
supportable.188） Therefore, they noted that the traditional rule-of-reason approach of the Sherman Act, 
which evaluated RPM agreements according to their actual economic effects, was the far wiser course. 
They criticized the bill, which proposed to ban all RPM agreements regardless of their actual effects on 
competition and consumer welfare, as lacking cautious consideration essential in dealing with RPM.189）
    As for economic analysis of RPM, the minority argued that RPM agreements could be procompetitive 
and benefit consumers and competition, citing many economists’ theses, most of which were reflected in 
an amicus brief by economists in Leegin.190） In addition, it refers to academic figures in the antitrust 
community, who had recommended before Leegin that the per se rule by Dr. Miles be overruled. For 
example, the Senators of the minority opinion warned that it would be no less of a mistake for Congress to 
repeat the Dr. Miles Court’ s error by recreating a per se rule that is unsupported by the economic evidence, 
relying on Judge Posner’ s book which stated that the old, judicially created per se rule against RPM, was “a 
sad mistake. There is neither theoretical basis, nor empirical support, for thinking the practice generally 
anticompetitive.”191） They also endorsed Professor Hovenkamp’ s idea shown in his book that “Dr. Miles 
per se rule was unfortunate” and “the wrong rule, given that much RPM is competitively benign in the 
great majority of situations when it is not being used to facilitate collusion.”192） Further, they confirmed 
that Professor Hovenkamp also concluded in his treatise on antitrust law, co-written with the late 
Professor Areeda, that “[to] the extent that Dr. Miles rested on the false categorical propositions that 
resale price maintenance never benefits manufacturers and always has the same effects as an illegal dealer 
cartel, its ruling is ripe for reexamination.”193）
    Keeping in mind the above-mentioned arguments by economic and antitrust experts, the Senators 
criticized that the majority’ s report cited no economic or empirical evidence showing that consumer 
welfare had been harmed in the aftermath of the Leegin decision. They pointed out that the majority’ s 
reference to an economic prediction from Justice Breyer’ s dissenting opinion, who was not seen as an 
economic policy expert, is outweighed by the economic evidence demonstrated by many economic 
experts.194） Although the minority’ s report noted that the majority’ s arguments were unconvincing and 
that the proposed bill was premature to enact, it also admitted that it was still too early to draw meaningful 
conclusions about the Leegin decision’ s economic consequences. Therefore, they suggested that Congress 
wait until the economic evidence had time to emerge through lower court cases.195）
    The minority’ s report acknowledged and embraced the Leegin decision and supported the trend of the 
Court in steadily moving away from per se rules in accordance with the development of sound economic 
principles.196） And, considering that courts have been given the latitude to fine-tune their understanding of 
what is, and what is not, an unreasonable restraint of trade based on experience, and a continually 
developing understanding of economics, the minority’ s report strongly criticized the bill’ s aberrational 
designation of a specific type of agreement as an unreasonable restraint of trade.197） The minority’ s report 
pointed out the danger of maintaining a mistaken view of RPM, which would treat price as the only 
consideration for measuring consumer welfare.198） The Senators stated, in accordance with economic 
scholarship, that consumer-welfare and economic output were maximized when consumers were able to 
choose from a range of products with varying levels of quality and service, and that such diversity in the 
market could be unsustainable if RPM were to be flatly banned.199）
    For the foregoing reasons, the Senators of the minority view concluded that the rule of reason was the 
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appropriate standard in RPM cases, and declined to join the majority’ s effort to recreate by statute a 
judicial rule which would contravene sound economic principles.200）
Ⅲ .  LEEGIN ON REMAND
    In Leegin, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit which had held the application 
of the per se rule to RPM, remanding the case for further proceedings under the rule of reason. After 
receiving the case, the Fifth Circuit sent the case back to the district court which had initially depended on 
the per se rule.201） The district court, applying the new rule of reason standard, dismissed the case this time 
in favor of the defendant Leegin.202） Against the plaintiff PSKS, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’ s holding that PSKS failed to adequately allege a relevant market.  The Fifth Circuit also found that 
PSKS failed to demonstrate anticompetitive effects of the Leegin’ s RPM policy in the absence of Leegin’ s 
market power. The following were the main issues raised at the remand stage.204）
A.  Market Definition and Market Power
    As the district court stated on remand, like many other courts before it, the first step in a rule-of-reason 
analysis was to determine the relevant market. In terms of antitrust claims for anticompetitive RPM, 
plaintiffs had to plausibly define the proper relevant market under the rule of reason. According to Du Pont, 
relevant market was determined by considering all reasonably interchangeable alternatives based on price, 
use, and quality.205） The Fifth Circuit on remand affirmed the citation regarding market definition by the 
district court and cited again the same precedent more explicitly than the district court. In Apani, the Fifth 
Circuit had held that, “[w]here the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with reference to 
the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand, or alleges a proposed relevant 
market that clearly does not encompass all interchangeable substitute products even when all factual 
inferences are granted in plaintiff’ s favor, the relevant market is legally insufficient, and a motion to dismiss 
may be granted.”206）
    In its second amended complaint, PSKS alleged that the relevant product markets at issue in the case 
were the “retail market for Brighton’ s women’ s accessories” and the “wholesale sale of brand-name 
women’ s accessories to independent retailers.” In response to the former claim that Brighton’ s products 
had their own market, Leegin opposed the market definition, arguing that countless brands were 
reasonably interchangeable in use with Brighton products. The district court associated PSKS’ s market 
definition with a single brand market argument and stated the difficulty of insisting on such a single 
market as a relevant market in the light of previous cases including precedent from within the Circuit. In 
Domed Stadium, the Fifth Circuit held that absent exceptional market conditions, one brand in a market of 
competing brands could not constitute a relevant product market.207） Referring to Kodak,208） the court of 
appeals also held that, in rare circumstances, a single brand of a product could constitute a relevant market 
for antitrust purposes. According to Kodak, that possibility was limited to situations in which consumers 
were “locked in” to a specific brand by the nature of the product.209） The “locked in” situations could be 
caused by a structural barrier in the market, but no such structural barrier was found in terms of 
interchangeability of Brighton products with other competing manufacturers’ products, nor had PSKS 
alleged any such structural barriers at trial.
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    With regard to the single brand market definition, PSKS argued that Brighton-brand products were 
unique and distinct from other manufacturers’ products, enough to constitute its own submarket. The 
district court, although acknowledging precedents which recognized the existence of economically 
significant submarkets, held that PSKS failed to allege a tenable broader market to its alleged submarket. 
To be precise, the district court mentioned, “[w]hile PSKS may have pleaded facts sufficient to define a 
submarket, that alone will not get PSKS past the clear law that a single brand cannot be its own market.”
210） As for the alleged submarket definition, the Fifth Circuit held that such submarket must exist within a 
broader economic market and that the requirements for pleading a submarket were no different from 
those for pleading a relevant broader market.211）
    In response to the PSKS’ s second proposed market definition, the “wholesale sale of brand-name 
women’ s accessories to independent retailers,” Leegin argued that the “gerrymandered” product market 
definition lacked rationale in terms of interchangeability with Brighton’ s products. By breaking the market 
definition down into four components (wholesale sale, brand-name, women’ s accessories and independent 
retailers), Leegin argued that the PSKS’ s claim regarding product market was wholly inappropriate.212） 
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit agreed with Leegin’ s argument on all the four components 
above, and concluded that the PSKS’ s market definition was inadequate for analyzing anticompetitive effect 
under the rule of reason. Firstly, both courts pointed out that the relevant markets had to be defined in 
terms of the product itself without regard to the distribution level against PSKS’ s “wholesale sale” market 
contention. Secondly, as for the PSKS’ s argument that the relevant product should include a “brand name” 
factor, both courts denied the argument because PSKS failed to sufficiently allege why Brighton products 
were not interchangeable with non-brand name products.213） Thirdly, both courts confirmed that 
“women’ s accessories” was too broad and vague to constitute a market and it grouped together products 
that were not interchangeable with each other.214） Lastly, neither of the courts could find any reason for 
including “independent retailers” in the market definition because PSKS had not alleged facts that could 
establish why independent retailers did not compete with other types of retailers selling exactly the same 
products.215）
    As for the relevant geographic market, PSKS alleged that the Greater Dallas Area was appropriate for its 
definition because it principally served customers in the area, purchased its products from the Dallas 
Market, and competed with other retail stores which also had their products sold at the Dallas Market. 
The district court held that the geographic market matters little in the circumstances in which a tenable 
product market has not been defined.216） In affirming the district court’ s holding in this regard, the Fifth 
Circuit found nothing about the relevant geographic market in its decision.
    Regarding the necessity of market power in relevant markets, on remand, there was a dispute between 
the parties whether the Supreme Court in Leegin intended that a showing of a defendant’ s market power as 
a requisite to establish a vertical price fixing arrangement had anticompetitive effects. PSKS, the plaintiff, 
argued that defining relevant market and pleading market power were not necessarily required under the 
reasoning in Leegin. On the other hand, Leegin, the defendant, argued that a manufacturer with market 
power was one of the specific scenarios in Leegin where vertical price restraints could limit interbrand 
competition and thus be anticompetitive. In fact, according to Leegin, “a manufacturer with market power 
might use resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or 
new entrants.”217） On remand, the district court, although recognizing the need to reach the issue, could 
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not assess the alleged vertical price restraint’ s anticompetitive effect because PSKS had not defined a 
relevant market properly. The Fifth Circuit, after mentioning that a market power screen was compatible 
with Leegin,218） and the Circuit’ s precedents, and the precedents of its sister Circuits, held that a plaintiff 
must plausibly allege the defendant’ s market power to allege a vertical restraint claim sufficiently.219）
B.  Anticompetitive Effects
    In support of its claim of anticompetitive effects caused by Leegin’ s RPM, PSKS alleged a few points, 
which were all rejected by the Fifth Circuit in the end. One of them was the high prices of Brighton 
products caused by the RPM. The court pointed out the deficiency of the claim in light of basic laws of 
economics, stating that an artificial price hike by Leegin would merely cause it to lose sales to its 
competitors in the absence of market power. Another point related to a limitation of intrabrand competition 
among retailers. According to PSKS’ s allegation, Leegin’ s RPM policy deprived consumers of “free and 
open competition in the purchase of Brighton-brand product.”Regarding the argument, the Fifth Circuit 
pointed out the importance of interbrand competition, which forced Brighton retailers to of fer a 
combination of price and service to attract consumers away from other competing brands’ products.220） 
The court also cited Leegin, which stated that robust intrabrand competition on service could exist even in 
the absence of price competition, and that retailers could seek to attract customers with better service, 
more knowledgeable staff, more appealing stores, and other non-price-oriented strategies.221）
    After holding that the Leegin’ s termination of PSKS as a retailer should not be viewed as an 
anticompetitive effect in light of Colgate,222） the Fifth Circuit found that PSKS had never alleged any 
relevant factors, especially those suggested in Leegin, that would indicate a plausible anticompetitive effect. 
In Leegin, the Supreme Court held that a dominant retailer and a retailer cartel could force a manufacturer 
to adopt RPM that it would not otherwise, and cause anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, in 
addition to a scenario where a manufacturer with market power could bring restriction on interbrand 
competition.223） Moreover, the Supreme Court suggested anticompetitive concerns if many competing 
manufacturers adopted RPMs broadly in the relevant market. The Fifth Circuit on remand held, as noted 
above, that none of those anticompetitive concerns were alleged in PSKS complaints.224）
C.  Horizontal Restraint Claims
    In its second amended complaint, PSKS alleged, for the first time, that Leegin had engaged in horizontal 
price fixing activities which were illegal per se. PSKS’ s horizontal restraint claims for per se analysis were 
summarized as arguments relying on the theories which were called “dual distribution system” and “hub 
and spoke conspiracy”. Neither of them was accepted by the district court under the mandate rule, which 
prevented litigation of waived issues on remand because they had never been raised in the lower court. 
The Fifth Circuit af firmed the decision stating that the district court rightly dismissed the PSKS’ s 
horizontal restraint claim as barred by the mandate rule. Emphasizing that the Supreme Court in Leegin 
did not specifically allow PSKS to re-plead allegations it had previously abandoned, the district court on 
remand rejected PSKS’ s argument that the mandate rule did not apply in the case.225） Moreover, the 
district court analogized the case on remand to the district court decision on remand in Sylvania,226） in 
which the plaintiff was not allowed to plead horizontal allegations after the Supreme Court overruled per se 
illegality against vertical non-price restraints, and remanded the case to be tried under the rule of reason.
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CONCLUSIONS
    In the four years after Leegin, several RPM-related cases were brought to the federal courts, where the 
courts tried to determine the important factors to be considered in assessing RPM under the rule of reason 
as stated in Chapter IIB. Even though it is premature to draw any definitive conclusion from the discussion 
in lower courts, it might be possible to suggest a certain tendency for the courts to handle the RPM-
related cases after Leegin. When reviewing lower court cases, it should be noted that Twombly, which was 
decided by the Supreme Court in the same year and a little earlier than Leegin, casts a long shadow over 
pleading a cause of action in federal courts. After Twombly, a plaintiff was required to allege sufficient facts 
to support a plausible argument claiming an antitrust violation in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 
Actually, in Spahr and Jacobs, the plaintiffs involved could not survive the motions to dismiss under the 
Twombly standard because they failed to plead plausible relevant markets and anticompetitive effects of 
RPM agreements at issue. In Babyage, on the other hand, the plaintiffs cleared Twombly standard as to 
relevant market. In those three cases, the evidence of cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable 
interchangeability of the products at issue, played a conclusive role in deciding whether the market 
definitions by the plaintiffs were plausible enough to withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss. In fact, the 
plaintiffs in Babyage succeeded in pleading several high-end products’ markets, which were distinct from 
those of ordinary products, by showing reasons and explanations based on cross-elasticity of demand and 
reasonable interchangeability of the products. As for anticompetitive effects at the pleading stage, Spahr 
and Jacobs confirmed that alleging only higher prices resulting from RPM as proof of actual harm to 
competition, was not sufficient to meet the Twombly standard. In this regard, the plaintiffs in Babyage were 
able to succeed in pleading anticompetitive effects of the RPM-related conduct in the case by alleging, 
with evidence, that the RPM raised retail prices beyond competitive level, reduced output lower than 
competitive level, and deteriorated quality and customer service than before.
    McDonough has some points of similarity with Babyage not only in fact but also in result. In the class 
action involving a retail giant of baby products, the plaintiffs in McDonough succeeded in showing that the 
vertical restraints, including RPM to prevent retail discounting, were initiated and coerced by the dominant 
retailer contrary to each manufacturer’ s independent economic self-interest. The plaintiffs also succeeded 
in proving both actual and potential anticompetitive effects of the challenged vertical restraints. The 
district court in McDonough found the existence of anticompetitive effects in the fact that the dominant 
retailer coerced the manufacturers into adopting vertical restraints to prevent retail discounting through 
its market power. The trait of the case, incidentally, can be found in the analytical framework that the Third 
Circuit, within which the district court sits, employs when examining antitrust cases under the rule of 
reason. According to the burden-shifting analysis, once a plaintiff meets the initial burden of showing 
adequate evidence of market power of the defendant, or actual anticompetitive effects of the challenged 
conduct, the burden shifts to the defendant for procompetitive justification.
    Toledo Mack was not a RPM case but rather a case in which certain vertical restraints between a 
manufacturer and its dealers were used in order to support illegal horizontal conspiracy among the 
dealers. But exploring the case may bring us some insight about the handling of vertical restraints by 
lower courts after Leegin. The Third Circuit in Toledo Mack stated, citing Leegin, that the rule-of-reason 
analysis would be applied even when a plaintiff alleged that the purpose of the vertical agreement between 
a manufacturer and its dealers was to support illegal horizontal agreements between multiple dealers. The 
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court of appeals also pointed out that the two possibly illegal situations clarified in Leegin were true even in 
vertical restraints other than RPM.227） As stated in Chapter I, Leegin showed that a retailer-driven vertical 
restraint created a more dangerous possibility of facilitating a dealer cartel.228） Therefore, the Third Circuit 
in Toledo Mack actually examined the source of the restraints in the immediate case, finding that the 
vertical agreements at issue were the result of the dealers’ pressure. The Third Circuit found that the 
manufacturer had market power in the relevant markets even though the vertical restraints challenged in 
the case were not RPM. The cour t based its reasoning on Leegin which stated that a dominant 
manufacturer with market power could abuse RPM for anticompetitive purposes and would cause a serious 
concern regarding competition.
    Although Valuepest examined what types of relationship constituted agreements to set prices under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it might be important to the extent of indicating that the GE doctrine is still 
alive after Leegin. In response to the argument that the Leegin Court denied the GE doctrine,229） the Fourth 
Circuit in Valuepest held that Leegin did not eliminate the agency defense to a claim of RPM, and found that 
the agency relationship between the defendants and their distributors was genuine in the case.
    It is still not clear when a RPM could be unlawful under the rule of reason even after the remand 
decisions of Leegin. As noted in Chapter III, the remand courts held that the plaintiff failed to allege 
properly defined relevant market for antitrust scrutiny.230） In other words, no further antitrust analysis 
could be done in the remand decisions beyond market definitions. Nonetheless, the remand courts’ 
approach confirmed that a plaintiff would have to allege and prove properly some classic and traditional 
elements of a rule-of-reason claim, to determine the existence of the defendant’ s market power in an 
adequately defined market, and the actual anticompetitive effects of RPM.
    As supporters of Leegin, DOJ and FTC reacted very quickly to the decision. FTC was quick to review a 
previous consent order and released the company involved from the prohibition of adopting RPM policy, 
by carefully considering the factors indicated by Leegin as having possibility of bringing anticompetitive 
consequences. DOJ’ s remarks after Leegin included a highly suggestive proposal for dealing with RPM 
under the rule of reason, although its practical applicability might be unknown. The antitrust division of the 
department proposed a structured rule-of-reason approach which would (1)permit courts to engage in a 
truncated review of RPM, (2)detail the elements that a plaintif f could use to establish a prima facie 
showing that burden shifted to defendants, and (3)use for guidance the scenarios identified by Leegin as 
potentially anticompetitive. This approach seems to be similar to that shown in McDonough, in that, its 
purpose is to ease the plaintiffs’ burden of proof under the rule of reason by shifting the burden to the 
defendants.
    As for the ongoing attempt in Congress to legislatively negate the Leegin decision, it seems fair to 
mention that the prospect of enactment is not clear in the face of strong opposition both in and out of 
Congress. Considering the rigid expression against RPM in the proposed bill, there might be concern that 
it would be inharmoniously embedded in the current fairly flexible language of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. Even if the legislative solution would not give rise to a significant problem regarding the interpretation 
or the expression of the Section, it should be noted that the bill, if enacted, would fix the treatment of RPM 
until Congress itself repeals it. Therefore, at this moment, it could be a hasty conclusion to enact the bill 
before examining carefully how lower courts would decide RPM under the rule of reason. It seems fair to 
say that more time is needed to observe how the courts will rule in future cases on the issue at hand, and 
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only then will we be able to ascertain whether the courts can adequately decide RPM based on empirical 
evidence, and whether their standards are convincing or not.
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understanding, PSKS failed to allege facts that supported the point that “brand-names” were important to 
interchangeability in the present case; while in Babyage, the plaintiff succeeded in pleading why “high-end” baby 
products were not interchangeable with other types of baby products.
214） The district court cited a sister case, Spahr, in which the judge held “picture frames do not compete with women’ s 
handbags, and shoes do not compete with jewelry.”
215） Leegin on remand, 2009 WL 938561, at *4, 615 F.3d at 418.
216） Leegin on remand, 2009 WL 938561, at *5. The district court mentioned that the geographic market definition 
based on where PSKS purchased its products was irrelevant.
217） Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894.
218） Id. at 898. The Fifth Circuit pointed out the Leegin holding, which had stated even anticompetitive uses of RPM had 
not created concern unless the relevant entity had market power.
219） Leegin on remand, 615 F.3d at 418.
220） Id. at 419.
221） Id.
222） United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
223） Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893-94.
224） Further, the Fifth Circuit on remand held that no proof of a harm to interbrand competition had been provided by 
PSKS even though the alleged facts were true. The court emphasized the necessity of providing antitrust injury 
which was held in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), and additionally pointed out the 
insufficiency of PSKS’ s factual claim in order to state an offence under Sherman Act in light of the pleading 
standard shown in Twombly.
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225） Leegin on remand, 2009 WL 938561, at *6.
226） Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D.Cal. 1978), aff ’d, 694 F.2d. 1132 (9th Cir. 1982).  In 
that remand decision, the Ninth Circuit cited, Omni Outdoor Adver. v. Columbia Outdoor Adver., 974 F.2d 502 (4th 
Cir. 1992).
227） Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 220-21.
228） See supra p. 8.
229） Gen. Electric, 272 U.S. at 484. The GE doctrine enabled defendants in RPM cases to avoid the application of the 
Sherman Act by proving their contracts with distributors represented a genuine agency relationship. 
230） See supra p.62-65.
 （2011年11月25日掲載決定）
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